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Abstract
This paper examines a model of charitable contributions in which there exist
both warm-glow and public good motives for giving, but where the warm-glow
motive is competitive in the sense that individuals evaluate their own contribution
relative to that of their peers. In this setting, it is shown that tax-￿nanced chari-
table contributions by the government completely crowd out private contributions
as the competitive element of the warm-glow motive intensi￿es. This implies that
the warm-glow assumption may not be the best way of explaining the empirical
evidence on incomplete crowding out. It is also shown that the tax-deductibility
of charitable contributions acts to strengthen the crowding-out e⁄ect, and that it
can be optimal to tax charitable contributions.
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The literature on charitable contributions, or more generally private contributions to
a public good, has identi￿ed two key motives for giving. The ￿rst is an altruistic or
public good motive, which is based on the idea that individuals care about the level
of the public good. Individuals therefore give to charity in order to increase the total
level of contributions. However, since individuals care only about the level of contri-
butions, and not the source of the contributions, free-riding may become problematic.
Indeed, an important result in the literature is that tax-￿nanced contributions by the
government completely crowd out private contributions (see, e.g., Sugden [1982], Warr
[1982], Roberts [1984], Bergstrom, et al. [1986], and Andreoni [1988]). The second key
motive put forward for giving is known as the warm-glow motive. The idea here is that
individuals obtain utility or a ￿warm-glow￿from the act of giving itself. In this case,
individuals do care about the source of the contribution￿ they prefer, ceteris paribus,
that they make the contribution. As a result, Andreoni [1989, 1990] shows that crowding
out is incomplete when there exist both warm-glow and public good motives for giving.
In this paper, we amend the warm-glow motive to include a competitive element.
That is, we assume that individuals evaluate the utility from their own charitable con-
tribution relative to the average contribution of their peers. The idea is that individuals
like to be seen as being relatively generous, and they seek to signal their generosity by
giving more than others. Apart from being intuitively appealing, the notion of a com-
petitive warm-glow motive for giving is similar to the (widespread) use of ￿keeping up
with the Joneses￿preferences in macroeconomics. There is also empirical evidence that
suggests individual contributions are positively in￿ uenced by the contributions of oth-
ers; see for example Glazer and Konrad [1996], Harbaugh [1998b], Andreoni and Petrie
[2004], and Rege and Telle [2004]. This is one of the reasons why charitable organisations
often publicise the names of their major donors and the size of the contribution.
The main results of our analysis can be summarised as follows. First, we show that
crowding out is incomplete when there are both competitive warm-glow and public good
motives for giving, but crowding out becomes complete as the competitive part of the
2warm-glow motive intensi￿es. Second, since charitable contributions are tax deductible
in many countries, taxable income in our model is endogenous and charitable contri-
butions are deductible against this income. We then show that the tax-deductibility of
charitable contributions acts to strengthen the crowding-out e⁄ect. Third, since the com-
petitive warm-glow motive for giving implies that individual giving imposes a negative
externality on others, the usual argument in favour of allowing charitable contributions
to be tax deductible (which is based on its public good characteristics) is weakened. We
therefore derive the optimal tax/subsidy on charitable contributions, and show that it
can be optimal to tax charitable contributions.
The papers most closely related to ours are those by Glazer and Konrad [1996], Har-
baugh [1998a], Romano and Yildirim [2001], Duncan [2004], and Blumkin and Sadka
[2007]. The papers by Glazer and Konrad [1996], Harbaugh [1998a], and Blumkin and
Sadka [2007] consider a prestige motive for giving, which is similar to the competitive
warm-glow motive that we develop. However, their focus is on the use of charitable con-
tributions to signal status and/or the implications for the crowding-out hypothesis are
not explored.1 Romano and Yildirim [2001] also allow for a prestige-like motive for giv-
ing, but their focus is on the strategic behaviour of donors and charitable organisations.
Duncan [2004] develops an ￿impact￿theory of philanthropy, in which individuals care
about the e⁄ectiveness of their donations.2 In his model, individual giving imposes a
negative externality on others since under an assumption of diminishing returns, individ-
ual giving reduces the marginal e⁄ectiveness of additional contributions. Interestingly,
Duncan [2004] shows, amongst other things, that tax-￿nanced charitable contributions
by the government can crowd in private contributions.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model,
1In Glazer and Konrad [1996] charitable contributions are made to signal wealth, and they ￿nd
that crowding out is incomplete. Harbaugh [1998a] and Blumkin and Sadka [2007] do not consider the
crowding-out hypothesis. Harbaugh [1998a] focuses on the behaviour of charitable organisations rather
than donors, while Blumkin and Sadka [2007] show that the optimal tax on charitable contributions
is non-negative when it is chosen as part of an optimal redistributive tax system. Saez [2004] and
Diamond [2006] also examine the taxation/subsidisation of charitable contributions as part of optimal
redistributive tax systems.
2A similar idea to impact philanthropy has recently been developed by Atkinson [2009] to explain
the prevalence of giving for overseas development.
3Section 3 examines the crowding-out hypothesis, and Section 4 derives the optimal
tax/subsidy applicable to charitable contributions. Section 5 concludes, while some
mathematical details are relegated to an appendix.
2 Analytical Framework
Consider an economy populated by n ￿ 2 identical individuals. Each individual i chooses
her own consumption ci, her contribution to charity gi, and her labour supply li to
maximise the utility function:
u(ci) + v(￿(gi ￿ ￿g￿i) + (1 ￿ ￿)G) ￿ z(li) (2.1)
subject to the budget constraint:
ci + gi ￿ wli ￿ t(wli ￿ ￿gi) ￿ ￿i (2.2)
where the functions u(￿) and v(￿) are increasing and strictly concave, while z(￿) is increas-
ing and strictly convex. Total contributions to charity are denoted by G. The average
contribution to charity by all individuals other than individual i is denoted by g￿i, with
￿ 2 (0;1) measuring the extent to which individuals evaluate their own contribution
relative to the average contribution of their peers. The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) therefore
represents the weight individuals place on the ￿competitive￿warm-glow motive for giv-
ing, while (1 ￿ ￿) is the weight placed on the public good motive. It can be seen that
individual charitable contributions impose a negative externality on others through the
competitive warm-glow motive for giving, but they also generate a positive externality
by increasing total contributions. It can also be seen that as ￿ ! 0, there is only the
public good motive for giving, as in Bergstrom, et al. [1986] among others. And as
￿ ! 0, there is both the standard warm-glow motive and the public good motive, as
introduced by Andreoni [1989, 1990].
The wage rate is denoted by w, the exogenously determined income tax rate is de-
noted by t 2 (0;1), and ￿ represents the tax/subsidy applied to charitable contributions.
4For example, a value of ￿ = 1 would indicate that contributions are 100% deductible
against taxable income, as is currently the policy in many countries. Alternatively,
a negative value of ￿ would indicate that charitable contributions are taxed. Finally,
￿i ￿ 0 is a lump-sum tax imposed on individual i, with the proceeds going to charity.
Therefore, total charitable contributions G can be written as G = gi+G￿i+
P
￿i, where
G￿i denotes total contributions by all individuals other than individual i.
Assuming that the budget constraint (2.2) binds at an optimum, it can be solved for
ci and substituted into the utility function (2.1). It is also assumed (i.e., we make the
Nash conjecture) that each individual takes the charitable contributions of everyone else
as given when solving programme (2:1) ￿ (2:2). The ￿rst-order conditions on gi and li
for an interior maximum can then be written as:
u
0(wli ￿ t(wli ￿ ￿gi) ￿ ￿i ￿ gi)(￿t ￿ 1) + v
0(￿(gi ￿ ￿g￿i) + (1 ￿ ￿)G) = 0 (2.3)
u
0(wli ￿ t(wli ￿ ￿gi) ￿ ￿i ￿ gi)(1 ￿ t)w ￿ z
0(li) = 0 (2.4)
Given that all individuals are identical, equations (2.3) and (2.4) can be rewritten as:
u
0(wl ￿ t(wl ￿ ￿g) ￿ ￿ ￿ g)(￿t ￿ 1) + v
0(￿(1 ￿ ￿)g + (1 ￿ ￿)n(g + ￿)) = 0 (2.5)
u
0(wl ￿ t(wl ￿ ￿g) ￿ ￿ ￿ g)(1 ￿ t)w ￿ z
0(l) = 0 (2.6)
where, since all individuals are identical, the i subscript is no longer required.
3 Crowding Out
One of the key issues addressed in the literature is the extent to which tax-￿nanced
charitable contributions by the government crowd out private contributions. The pur-
pose of this section is to examine how crowding out is a⁄ected by the introduction of the
competitive warm-glow motive for giving, as well as the tax-deductibility of charitable
contributions.
Suppose hg;l;w;t;￿;￿;￿;￿;ni is a solution to equations (2.5) and (2.6). Then by
5the Implicit Function Theorem there exist functions g = g(w;t;￿;￿;￿;￿;n) and l =





￿u00(c)(￿t ￿ 1)z00(l) ￿ v00(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)n[u00(c)(1 ￿ t)2w2 ￿ z00(l)]
￿u00(c)(￿t ￿ 1)2z00(l) + v00(￿)[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)n][u00(c)(1 ￿ t)2w2 ￿ z00(l)]
(3.1)
where u00(c) = u00(wl ￿ t(wl ￿ ￿g) ￿ ￿ ￿ g) and v00(￿) = v00(￿(1 ￿ ￿)g + (1 ￿ ￿)n(g + ￿)).
Consider ￿rst the case when charitable contributions are not tax deductible (i.e.,
suppose ￿ = 0). Then using equation (3.1) we obtain:
Remark 1 If ￿ = 0, then lim
￿!0
@g(￿)
@￿ = ￿1; that is, crowding out is complete.
Remark 2 If ￿ = 0, then lim
￿!0
@g(￿)
@￿ 2 (￿1;0); that is, crowding out is incomplete.
Remarks 1 and 2 are not new results. Remark 1 is the well-known result that crowding
out is dollar-for-dollar when there is only the public good motive for giving.3 Remark 2
is the main result of Andreoni [1989, 1990] that crowding out is incomplete when there
are both warm-glow and public good motives for giving. Our ￿rst result relates to the
implications of the competitive warm-glow motive for giving:
Proposition 1 If ￿ = 0, then lim
￿!1
@g(￿)
@￿ = ￿1; that is, crowding out becomes complete as
the competitive element of the warm-glow motive for giving intensi￿es.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. An increase in lump-sum taxation
that is used to ￿nance the government￿ s contribution to charity causes each individual to
reduce their own contribution, since a characteristic of the public good motive for giving
is that individuals are indi⁄erent as to the source of the contribution (they care only
about the level of contributions). Furthermore, each individual￿ s lower contribution
attenuates the negative externality that individual giving imposes on others through
the competitive warm-glow motive, which allows individuals to further reduce their
charitable contribution. In the limiting case in which the warm-glow motive is purely
competitive (i.e., as ￿ ! 1), crowding out becomes complete.
Now consider the case when charitable contributions are tax deductible, i.e., suppose
3See in particular Bergstrom et al. [1986], and Andreoni [2006] for a discussion of the literature and
some related ￿neutrality￿results.
6￿ 2 (0; 1
t).4 Then using equation (3.1) we obtain:




@￿ < ￿1; that is, crowding out becomes greater
than dollar-for-dollar as the weight on the public good motive for giving increases.




@￿ < 0; that is, crowding out can be greater
than, equal to, or less than dollar-for-dollar as the competitive element of the warm-glow
motive for giving disappears.




@￿ < ￿1; that is, crowding out becomes greater
than dollar-for-dollar as the competitive element of the warm-glow motive for giving
intensi￿es.
Propositions 2, 3, and 4 can be read in comparison with Remarks 1, 2, and Propo-
sition 1, respectively. The comparison reveals that the tax deductibility of charitable
contributions acts to strengthen the tendency for tax-￿nanced charitable contributions
by the government to crowd out private contributions. The intuition is as follows. An
increase in lump-sum taxation to ￿nance the government￿ s contribution to charity will
again cause individuals to reduce their own contribution due to the public good e⁄ect.
And since charitable contributions are tax deductible, each individual￿ s lower contribu-
tion will, ceteris paribus, increase their income tax liability. The resulting (negative)
income e⁄ect further reduces each individual￿ s charitable contribution, thus reinforcing
the crowding-out e⁄ect.
4 Optimal Tax/Subsidy on Charitable Contributions
The fact that charitable contributions have positive external e⁄ects makes a case for
subsidisation, since the market level of contributions will typically be lower than the
socially-optimal level (see, e.g., Kaplow [1995, 1998]). This is one of the reasons why
charitable contributions are granted a favourable tax treatment in many countries. How-
ever, the existence of a competitive warm-glow motive for giving weakens the case for
subsidisation, since it implies that charitable contributions also have negative external
e⁄ects. In light of these countervailing forces, the purpose of this section is to derive an
4If ￿ ￿ 1=t, then the ￿rst-order conditions (2.3) and (2.5) cannot be satis￿ed.
7expression for the optimal tax/subsidy on charitable contributions.
To this end, consider the following planning problem in order to derive the socially-
optimal allocation. The social planner will choose consumption c, the contribution to
charity g, and labour supply l to maximise the utility of a representative individual:
u(c) + v(￿(1 ￿ ￿)g + (1 ￿ ￿)ng) ￿ z(l) (4.1)
subject to the budget constraint:
c + g ￿ (1 ￿ t)wl (4.2)
Some comments on programme (4:1) ￿ (4:2) are in order. First, the planner will
internalise both the negative externality from the competitive warm-glow motive for
giving and the positive externality from the public good motive. This explains the
nature of the argument of the v(￿) function. Second, the tax/subsidy ￿ on charitable
contributions is absent, since the planner is able to directly determine the level of private
contributions. Third, since it is assumed that the income tax rate t is exogenously
determined, it is taken as given by the planner.5 Fourth, since we are not concerned
here with charitable contributions by the government, the lump-sum tax ￿ is set equal
to zero.
Assuming that the budget constraint (4.2) is binding, it can be solved for c and
substituted into the utility function (4.1). The ￿rst-order conditions on g and l for an
interior maximum are:
￿u
0((1 ￿ t)wl ￿ g) + v
0(￿(1 ￿ ￿)g + (1 ￿ ￿)ng)(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)n) = 0 (4.3)
u
0((1 ￿ t)wl ￿ g)(1 ￿ t)w ￿ z
0(l) = 0 (4.4)
5Thus the analysis of taxation in this paper is one of ￿tax reform￿rather than ￿optimal taxation￿ ,
since it is implicitly assumed that the income tax and the tax/subsidy on charitable contributions are
chosen in a piecemeal manner. While the optimal tax approach is the most common in the taxation
literature, the tax reform approach is considered a better description of actual government behaviour.
See for instance Feldstein [1976] and Guesnerie [1977, 1995] for a discussion of these issues.
8Equations (4.3) and (4.4) can be manipulated to yield the following marginal rates of
substitution between consumption, charitable contributions, and labour that hold at a
social optimum:
MRSb gb c =




￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)n
(4.5)
MRSb lb c =
z0(b l)
u0(b c)
= (1 ￿ t)w (4.6)
MRSb gb l =




(1 ￿ t)w(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)n)
(4.7)
where MRSij denotes the marginal rate of substitution of commodity i for commodity
j, and the notation b i is used to denote the socially-optimal level of commodity i.
Similarly, equations (2.5) and (2.6) can be manipulated to yield the following mar-
ginal rates of substitution that hold in the market solution (with ￿ = 0):
MRSgc =
v0(￿(1 ￿ ￿)g + (1 ￿ ￿)ng)
u0(c)




= (1 ￿ t)w (4.9)
MRSgl =






The optimal tax/subsidy on charitable contributions can be found by setting its
level to minimise the di⁄erence between the market allocation and the socially-optimal
allocation. That is, choose ￿ to minimise:
1
2








(MRSgl ￿ MRSb gb l)
2 (4.11)
It is shown in the Appendix that the optimal tax/subsidy on charitable contributions is
equal to:
b ￿ =
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)n ￿ 1
t(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)n)
(4.12)
It is also shown in the Appendix that b ￿ yields MRSgc = MRSb gb c, MRSlc = MRSb lb c,
9and MRSgl = MRSb gb l, so that b ￿ eliminates all marginal distortions associated with the
external e⁄ects of charitable contributions.
Using equation (4.12) we obtain the following results:
Proposition 5 lim
￿!1
b ￿ = ￿￿
t(1￿￿) < 0; that is, it is optimal to tax charitable contributions
as the weight on the competitive warm-glow motive for giving increases.
Proposition 6 lim
￿!0
b ￿ = n￿1
tn > 0; that is, it is optimal to subsidise charitable contribu-





t(￿+(1￿￿)n) > 0; that is, it is optimal to subsidise charitable
contributions as the competitive element of the warm-glow motive for giving disappears.
The intuition behind Propositions 5, 6, and 7 is quite simple. Proposition 5 shows
that it becomes optimal to tax charitable contributions when the competitive warm-glow
motive for giving su¢ ciently dominates the public good motive, the reason being that the
negative externality associated with the competitive warm-glow motive will dominate
the positive externality associated with the public good motive. Likewise, Propositions
6 and 7 show that it is optimal to subsidise charitable contributions when the public
good motive for giving su¢ ciently dominates the competitive warm-glow motive and/or
the competitive element of the warm-glow motive is su¢ ciently small.
Propositions 5, 6, and 7 establish that either a tax or subsidy on charitable contribu-
tions can be optimal. Our ￿nal proposition shows that it can be optimal for charitable
contributions to be more than 100% deductible against taxable income:
Proposition 8 lim
n!1
b ￿ = 1
t > 1; that is, it is optimal for charitable contributions to
become more than 100% tax deductible as the number of individuals increases.
The proof of Proposition 8 follows from an application of L￿ Hopital￿ s Rule to equation
(4.12). To interpret Proposition 8, consider equations (4.5) and (4.7). These equations
show that as n ! 1, the socially-optimal allocation has MRSb gb c ￿ 0 and MRSb gb l ￿ 0.
The intuition is that the planner must decide how to allocate income between private
consumption and charitable contributions. But since charitable contributions are a pub-
lic good, there tends to be a higher utility payo⁄from favouring charitable contributions.
And since this payo⁄is increasing in the number of individuals, the planner will increas-
ingly favour charitable contributions as the number of individuals increases. In order to
10induce the market to achieve this socially-optimal allocation, the subsidy on charitable
contributions must be increased towards its maximum possible level, i.e., 1=t ￿ " where
" is some in￿nitesimally small positive number.
5 Closing Remarks
Traditional models of private contributions to a public good (such as a charity), as ex-
empli￿ed by Bergstrom et al. [1986], conclude that tax-￿nanced contributions by the
government completely crowd out private contributions. In light of the empirical evi-
dence that suggests crowding out is incomplete, it has been suggested (e.g., Andreoni
[1989, 1990]) that the addition of a warm-glow motive for giving helps reconcile the
results from theoretical models with the empirical evidence. However, this paper has
shown that if the warm-glow motive contains a competitive element, then the theory
predicts that crowding out becomes complete as the competitive element intensi￿es. To
the extent that one accepts adding a competitive element to the warm-glow motive as
plausible, it follows that the warm-glow motive may not be the best way of reconcil-
ing theory with fact. Instead, other motives for giving, such as the theory of impact
philanthropy advanced by Duncan [2004], may be better explanations. We have also
shown that the tax-deductibility of charitable contributions￿ which is a feature of many
real-world tax codes￿ works in favour of the crowding-out hypothesis, and that the com-
petitive warm-glow motive for giving implies that it can be optimal to tax charitable
contributions.
6 Appendix
Derivation of Equation (3.1)
The Hessian associated with equations (2.5) and (2.6) is:
H =
2
4u00(c)(￿t ￿ 1)2 + v00(￿)[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)n] u00(c)(￿t ￿ 1)(1 ￿ t)w
u00(c)(￿t ￿ 1)(1 ￿ t)w u00(c)(1 ￿ t)2w2 ￿ z00(l)
3
5 (A.1)
11where u00(c) = u00(wl ￿ t(wl ￿ ￿g) ￿ ￿ ￿ g) and v00(￿) = v00(￿(1 ￿ ￿)g + (1 ￿ ￿)n(g + ￿)).
The determinant of H is given by:














Since j H j6= 0, it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem and Cramer￿ s Rule that
@g(￿)=@￿ = ￿ j A j = j H j, where:
A =
2
4￿u00(c)(￿t ￿ 1) + v00(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)n u00(c)(￿t ￿ 1)(1 ￿ t)w
















Equations (A.2) and (A.4) can then be combined to yield equation (3.1). ￿
Derivation of Equation (4.12)
It follows from equations (4:5) ￿ (4:10) that choosing ￿ to minimise:
1
2








(MRSgl ￿ MRSb gb l)
2 (A.5)





1 ￿ ￿t ￿
1










(1 ￿ t)w(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)n)
￿2
(A.6)









1 ￿ ￿t ￿
1
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)n
￿2
(A.7)











1 ￿ ￿t ￿
1
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)n
￿
(￿t) = 0 (A.8)
12Solving equation (A.8) for ￿ yields equation (4.12).
Finally, it follows directly from equations (4.6) and (4.9) that MRSlc = MRSb lb c,
and it follows from equation (A.7) that b ￿ yields Z = 0. Hence MRSgc = MRSb gb c and
MRSgl = MRSb gb l. ￿
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